Social Welfare Maximization for Quadratic Games With Unknown and Mixed Types of Dynamics

Yuyue Yan; Maojiao Ye

doi:10.1109/JAS.2026.125810

Volume 13 Issue 5

May 2026

IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica

JCR Impact Factor: 19.2, Top 1 (SCI Q1)

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Y. Yan and M. Ye, “Social welfare maximization for quadratic games with unknown and mixed types of dynamics,” IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 1245–1247, May 2026. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2026.125810

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Y. Yan and M. Ye, “Social welfare maximization for quadratic games with unknown and mixed types of dynamics,” IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 1245–1247, May 2026. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2026.125810

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Social Welfare Maximization for Quadratic Games With Unknown and Mixed Types of Dynamics

doi: 10.1109/JAS.2026.125810

Yuyue Yan^,,
Maojiao Ye^{,
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